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Hepatitis C virus (HCV) infections have sharply increased in the United States, where an estimat-
ed 2.4 million persons are living with chronic infec-
tion (1). In 2013, ≈19,368 persons died of HCV-related 
complications, exceeding the number of deaths from 
all other nationally notifiable infectious diseases 
combined (2). During 2004–2014, prevalence of HCV 
increased by 2-fold, a direct result of the opioid epi-
demic and associated increases in the sharing of con-
taminated injection drug use equipment (3). Because 
the intersecting epidemics of opioid injection and 
infectious diseases are complex and dynamic, imple-
menting community-specific comprehensive preven-
tion services remains challenging.
Public health experts are increasingly using mo-
lecular-based surveillance techniques to identify and 
control emerging outbreaks (4–7). For example, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
has scaled up use of molecular HIV surveillance (8); 
however, the application of such programs for HCV 
surveillance has lagged. For molecular HCV surveil-
lance and outbreak investigation, CDC developed a 
public health tool, Global Hepatitis Outbreak and Sur-
veillance Technology (GHOST), which uses next-gen-
eration sequencing methods (9). GHOST integrates a 
suite of computational tools to accurately detect pos-
sible HCV transmission clusters from next-generation 
sequencing data in a simple fashion, regardless of the 
user’s level of expertise.
During 2016–2017, the rate of opioid overdose 
in Wisconsin increased by 109%, the steepest in-
crease observed in any US state and nearly 3 times 
the average national increase over that period (10). 
This sharp increase in opioid use was accompanied 
by substantial increases in HCV incidence. During 
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Ending the hepatitis C virus (HCV) epidemic requires 
stopping transmission among networks of persons who 
inject drugs. Identifying transmission networks by using 
genomic epidemiology may inform community responses 
that can quickly interrupt transmission. We retrospective-
ly identified HCV RNA–positive specimens correspond-
ing to 459 persons in settings that use the state labora-
tory, including correctional facilities and syringe services 
programs, in Wisconsin, USA, during 2016–2017. We 
conducted next-generation sequencing of HCV and 
analyzed it for phylogenetic linkage by using the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention Global Hepati-
tis Outbreak Surveillance Technology platform. Analysis 
showed that 126 persons were linked across 42 clusters. 
Phylogenetic clustering was higher in rural communities 
and associated with female sex and younger age among 
rural residents. These data highlight that HCV transmis-
sion could be reduced by expanding molecular-based 
surveillance strategies to rural communities affected by 
the opioid crisis.
 Hepatitis C Virus Clusters, Wisconsin, USA
2011–2015, an average of 2,955 new HCV diagnoses 
were reported annually; during the previous 5-year 
period, the average was 2,396. As a result of recent 
injection drug use, the rate of new PCR-confirmed 
HCV diagnoses among persons 15–29 years of age 
more than doubled during that period, from 40 to 87 
cases/100,000 population (11).
In this study, we integrated public heath surveil-
lance and molecular analyses with GHOST to identify 
putative HCV transmission clusters among persons 
most likely infected through injection drug use dur-
ing a period of expanded HCV transmission (12). We 
also investigated the network characteristics among 
members of this high-risk group.
Materials and Methods
Study Setting and Population
All HCV-positive test results in Wisconsin are rou-
tinely reported to the Wisconsin Electronic Disease 
Surveillance System (WEDSS), a secure, Internet-
based health information system used for the report-
ing, investigation, and surveillance of communicable 
diseases in Wisconsin. Blood samples collected for 
HCV RNA confirmatory testing at sites supported by 
the Wisconsin Division of Public Health (e.g., syringe 
services programs [SSPs], correctional facilities, lo-
cal health departments, community-based organiza-
tions, and public health clinics) are processed at the 
Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene and stored for 
5 years. Approximately 15% of all HCV cases report-
ed to WEDSS represent persons who underwent fee-
exempt HCV RNA confirmatory testing through the 
state laboratory. The cohort of persons tested com-
prised primarily younger persons with a history of 
injection drug use, resulting from the types of organi-
zations that submit test results to the state laboratory.
We identified persons confirmed to have an HCV 
RNA–positive sample analyzed at the state labora-
tory and reported to WEDSS for the first time dur-
ing 2016–2017 by 2 methods. First, we identified 241 
persons residing in rural catchment areas. Of the 72 
counties in Wisconsin, 51 were included in the rural 
catchment area and selected on the basis of participa-
tion in an ongoing federally funded research program. 
These counties were classified as rural because they 
were served by 1 of the 6 rural offices of the statewide 
SSP. Second, to improve network completeness and 
compare the extent of clustering between rural and 
nonrural populations, we identified 2 additional co-
horts: 54 persons residing in nonrural catchment ar-
eas and 164 residing in correctional facilities. Because 
resource limitations prevented data collection from 
all HCV-infected persons in nonrural catchment ar-
eas and correctional facilities, we included those who 
were considered likely to represent recent or acute 
infections because they either had acute HCV when 
reported to WEDSS or were 15–39 years of age at di-
agnosis with an HCV viral load >1,000,000 IU/L. The 
nonrural catchment area included the other 21 Wis-
consin counties served by 1 of the 4 SSP urban offices, 
and the correctional cohort included those incarcer-
ated in a state correctional setting (i.e., state prison) at 
the time of testing.
Specimen Processing
Per standard protocol, the state laboratory stores se-
rum remaining after completion of HCV antibody and 
RNA PCR testing at -80°C. Specimens correspond-
ing to the HCV RNA–positive persons identified in 
WEDSS were retrieved and shipped to the Ragon In-
stitute of MGH, MIT and Harvard (Cambridge, MA, 
USA) for virus sequencing.
Nucleic Acid Extraction and PCR Amplification
RNA was isolated from 140 µL of plasma by using 
a QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (QIAGEN, https://
www.qiagen.com). A 1-step reverse transcription 
PCR (RT-PCR) was performed to amplify a 305-bp 
segment at the E1/E2 junction of the HCV genome 
(H77 positions 1301–1606), which contains the hyper-
variable region (HVR) 1 (13). This region was cho-
sen for its high variability and its ability to reliably 
detect transmission events in outbreak settings (14). 
The first round of RT-PCR consisted of an Illumina 
adaptor-specific portion, a sample-specific barcode 





ATG-TGC-CAG-CTG-CCG-TTG-GTG-T at a final 
concentration of 4 pM. Amplification conditions (Su-
perScript III One-Step RT-PCR System with Platinum 
Taq High Fidelity [ThermoFisher, https://www.
thermofisher.com]) were cDNA synthesis for 30 min 
at 55°C followed by heat denaturation at 95°C for 2 
min. PCR amplification conditions were 40 cycles of 
denaturation (94°C for 10 s), annealing (55°C for 10 s), 
and extension (68°C for 10 s) with a final extension at 
68°C for 5 min. Amplified products were run on 1% 
agarose gel and either PCR purified with a QIAquick 
PCR Purification Kit (QIAGEN) or gel extracted and 
purified by using a PureLink Quick Gel Extraction Kit 
(Invitrogen, https://www.thermofisher.com). A sec-
ond round of limited cycle PCR (94°C for 2 min, [94°C 
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for 15 s; 55°C for 30 s; 68°C for 30 s] × 8 cycles, 68°C 
for 5 min) was performed to add barcode-specific in-
dexes and sequencing-specific adapters and primers 
to each sample to allow for multiplexing as well as 
internal controls for cross-contamination. Negative 
controls were introduced at each stage, and all PCR 
procedures were performed under PCR clean room 
conditions by using established protocols. Indexed 
samples were purified by solid phase reversible im-
mobilization (SPRI) 2 times at a bead-to-DNA ratio 
of 0.7× to remove excess primer dimer and short frag-
ments that can interfere with the sequencing process.
Deep Sequencing and Analysis
Resulting PCR amplicons were quantified by using 
a PicoGreen kit (Invitrogen) on a QuantiFluor ST 
fluorometer (Promega, https://www.promega.com), 
and the integrity of the fragment was evaluated by 
using a 2100 Bioanalyzer (Agilent, https://www.
agilent.com). Samples were pooled and sequenced on 
an Illumina MiSeq platform (https://www.illumina.
com) by using a 2 × 250–bp v2 Nano reagent kit. A 
sequence library consisted of 8–16 specimens, includ-
ing 1 negative control for every 7 serum specimens. 
Paired-end reads were subject to stringent cleaning 
and quality control criteria as outlined previously 
(15–17). Duplicate reads were removed by using de-
fault settings with FastUniq version 1.1 (18) and qual-
ity trimmed by using Trimmomatic version 0.36 (19). 
Viral contigs were generated by using default settings 
with Vicuna version 1.1 (20), and a de novo consen-
sus assembly was generated by using Viral Finishing 
and Annotation Toolkit (V-FAT) version 1.1 (https://
www.broadinstitute.org/viral-genomics/v-fat). 
Read data are available from the National Center for 
Biotechnology Information Read Archive (https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) under BioProject accession 
no. PRJNA661611.
Phylogenetic Reconstruction
We aligned the consensus sequences by using MEGA 
version 6.0 (21) and IQ-TREE version 1.6 (22). We then 
constructed a maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree 
with 1,000 ultrafast bootstrap replicates (23).
HCV Transmission Network Analyses
We uploaded Illumina paired-end reads to GHOST 
and subjected them to automatic quality control cri-
teria. In brief, read pairs were filtered out if a read 
had >3 Ns (N indicates that software was not able 
to make a basecall for this base) or a length <185 
bp. Each identifier on forward and reverse reads 
was examined, and the pair was discarded if either 
identifier was not an exact match to a given list of 
valid identifiers. We discarded pairs containing valid 
identifiers if they were not a constituent of the majori-
ty identifier tuple. If >11% of the read pairs contained 
valid identifiers that were not the majority tuple, we 
discarded the entire sample without further process-
ing. Random subsampling of 5,000–20,000 read pairs 
was undertaken, and primer sequences were located 
in each read, allowing for a combined error total of 
<3. Read pairs were discarded when the primer could 
not be found. Remaining read pairs were then unified 
in a single error-corrected sequence, and only those 
sequences with a nonsense-free reading frame were 
collapsed into unique occurences with associated 
frequencies. Further methodologic details on quality 
filtering can be found elsewhere (9,24). We examined 
transmission links that represent the genetic similar-
ity among virus populations from infected persons. 
For each case, we compared the intrahost popula-
tions between infected persons and calculated the 
genetic distance (defined as the Hamming distance) 
between their closest haplotypes. If the genetic dis-
tance is smaller than an empirically defined threshold 
of 3.77%, then samples are considered to be genetical-
ly related and indicate a transmission cluster (14). To 
further analyze each cluster’s genetic relationship, we 
built k-step networks of intrahost HCV HVR1 vari-
ants, as previously described (9).
Data Collection
Variables routinely reported to WEDSS for HCV-
positive persons include age, sex, race/ethnicity, 
HCV-positive antibody and RNA test date(s), testing 
site(s), and residential address. In addition, persons 
tested by the multisite SSP provide risk information 
per standard HCV testing procedures. Reporting 
of risk information is voluntary. When possible, lo-
cal health department staff members gather risk in-
formation from the healthcare provider or directly 
from patients and enter it into WEDSS. Persons with 
HCV originally reported from state correctional fa-
cilities are not interviewed by local public health of-
ficials, and risk information for them is typically not 
available. When risk information was missing from 
WEDSS, we were unable to determine whether a pa-
tient answered “no” to a risk behavior or whether the 
data were missing. For persons who reported risk be-
haviors, we assessed whether they ever engaged in 
injection drug use, shared injection equipment, were 
men who have sex with men (MSM), or were ever 
incarcerated. Persons were considered ever incarcer-
ated if any result for an HCV test conducted at a state 
correctional facility was reported to WEDSS or if the 
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person reported (on risk information forms) having 
ever been incarcerated. Because availability of risk in-
formation depends on the type of facility where the 
person was tested, we present demographic charac-
teristics and risk behaviors by type of testing facility: 
SSP, correctional facility, local health department, or 
other public venue. Other venues include a limited 
number of community health centers, public health 
clinics, community-based organizations, and safety 
net hospitals. Local jails also were considered other 
venues because only 2 persons were tested in jails and 
local jails are more representative of where the per-
son resides, whereas persons may be placed in other 
facilities anywhere across the state regardless of their 
county of residence.
This study was approved by the University of 
Wisconsin Health Sciences Institutional Review 
Board, which granted a waiver of informed consent, 
and the Massachusetts General Hospital Institutional 
Review Board. Data Use Agreements and a Materi-
als Transfer Agreement were established between the 
University of Wisconsin, Wisconsin Division of Pub-
lic Health, the state laboratory, and the Ragon Insti-
tute of MGH, MIT and Harvard.
Statistical Analyses
To compare clustering by demographics and risk be-
haviors, we conducted χ2, Fisher exact, Student t, and 
analysis of variance tests by using Stata SE 16 (Stata-
Corp, https://www.stata.com). Because sampling 
techniques differed in rural and nonrural catchment 
areas and the characteristics assessed were strongly 
determined by which catchment area persons were 
in, and because persons tested in correctional facilities 
could come from either rural or nonrural areas of the 
state, we compared persons who clustered with those 
who did not cluster, stratified by 3 groups based on 
testing location: the rural catchment area, the nonru-
ral catchment area, and correctional facilities. We also 
compared characteristics between rural catchment 
area–only clusters, nonrural catchment area–only 
clusters, corrections-only clusters, and clusters that 
contained persons from >1 group. Statistical signifi-
cance was determined by using α<0.05.
Results
Study Sample
During 2016–2017, a total of 459 persons tested by the 
Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene were HCV 
RNA positive for the first time. For those 459 persons, 
sufficient (>200 µL) residual serum was stored to en-
able virus sequencing for 424 (92.4%). Of these, virus 
was successfully amplified, sequenced, and passed 
GHOST quality control metrics for 379 (89.4%) sam-
ples. Among the samples that failed, 23 (5.4%) failed 
PCR and 22 (5.2%) failed GHOST quality control met-
rics. After quality control, the median number of er-
ror-corrected reads/person was 16,740 (interquartile 
range 13,302–18,262) and the median number of hap-
lotypes was 3,322 (interquartile range 2,479–4,345).
Patient Demographic Characteristics and Risk Behaviors
Among the 379 persons whose specimens were suc-
cessfully analyzed by GHOST, positive HCV results 
were first obtained at an SSP for 119 (31.4%), a cor-
rectional facility for 154 (40.6%), a local health depart-
ment for 38 (10.0%), and other settings for 68 (17.9%) 
(Table 1). The study population was primarily non-
Hispanic white (83.9%), 18–39 years of age (90.8%), 
and male (75.5%). Self-reported injection drug use 
was documented for 177 (46.7%) persons. Of these, 
145 (81.9%) self-reported having ever shared injec-
tion equipment. MSM status was reported by 8 (2.1%) 
persons. Most of the study population (335 [88.4%]) 
had been incarcerated; 154 received their first HCV-
positive test result while at a correctional facility, and 
180 reported a history of incarceration.
Among the 379 persons, 171 (45.1%) resided in the 
rural catchment area, of which 67 (39.2%) clustered; 
54 (14.3%) resided in the nonrural catchment area, of 
which 14 (25.9%) clustered; and 154 (40.6%) resided in 
correctional facilities, of which 45 (29.2%) clustered. 
Among the 171 persons in the rural catchment area, 
women were significantly more likely to cluster (49%) 
than men (33%) (p = 0.04), and persons who clustered 
were significantly younger (mean age 28.7 years) than 
persons who did not cluster (mean age 34.1 years) (p 
= 0.0001). For in the nonrural catchment area or cor-
rections groups, we found no statistically significant 
differences between those who clustered and those 
who did not cluster.
Phylogenetic Analysis
We genetically characterized HCV strains by using 
HVR1 consensus sequences derived from isolates 
from all 379 persons. Phylogenetic analysis demon-
strated a predominance of genotypes 1a (n = 255, 
67.3%) and 3a (n = 88, 23.2%), followed by 2b (n = 22, 
5.8%), 1b (n = 9, 2.4%), 2a (n = 4, 1.1%), and 4a (n = 1, 
0.3%) (Figure 1).
HCV Transmission Linkages
GHOST detected 42 clusters comprising 126 persons 
for an overall clustering rate of 33% (Figure 2). Cluster 
sizes ranged from 2 to 11 persons. Transmission net-
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works were composed of mostly dyads (n = 23, 54.8%), 
followed by groups of 3 (n = 9, 21.4%), 4 (n = 3, 7.1%), 
and 5 (n = 6, 14.3%). The largest cluster involved 11 
persons, all infected with genotype 3a. Among those 
11 persons, 5 received their first HCV-positive test 
result from the same local health department and 3 
from the same SSP. Also among those 11 persons, 
evidence of past injection drug use was available for 
7 persons, 8 were male, and all 11 were non-Hispanic 
white with a history of incarceration.
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Table 1. Demographics and risk factor information, by type of testing facility, for all 379 persons tested for HCV while in public health 
or correctional settings, Wisconsin, USA, 2016–2017* 
Variable Overall no. (%) 
Setting of first HCV-positive test result, no. (%) 
Syringe services program Corrections setting Local health department Other 
Total 379 (100) 119 (31.4) 154(40. 6) 38 (10.0) 68 (17.9) 
Year first reported to 
WEDSS 
     
 2016 222 (58.6) 68 (57.1) 87 (56.5) 22 (57.9) 45 (66.2) 
 2017 157 (41.4) 51 (42.9) 67 (43.5) 16 (42.1) 23 (33.8) 
Age, y      
 18–29 190 (50.1) 57 (47.9) 77 (50.0) 19 (50.0) 37 (54.4) 
 30–39 154 (40.6) 39 (32.8) 75 (48.7) 16 (42.1) 24 (35.3) 
 >40 35 (9.2) 23 (19.3) 2 (1.3) 3 (7.9) 7 (10.3) 
Race/ethnicity      
 Non-Hispanic white 318 (83.9) 103 (86.6) 127 (82.5) 34 (89.5) 54 (79.4) 
 Hispanic or Latino 18 (4.8) 4 (3.4) 7 (4.6) 2 (5.3) 5 (7.4) 
 American Indian or 
 Alaska Native 
21 (5.5) 7 (5.9) 9 (5.8) 1 (2.6) 4 (5.9) 
 Asian 2 (0.5) 0 1 (0.7) 0 1 (1.5) 
 Non-Hispanic black or 
 African American 
12 (3.2) 4 (3.4) 5 (3.3) 1 (2.6) 2 (2.9) 
 Other/unknown 8 (2.1) 1 (0.8) 5 (3.3) 0 2 (2.9) 
Sex      
 F 93 (24.5) 44 (36.9) 14 (9.1) 13 (34.2) 22 (32.3) 
 M 286 (75.5) 75 (63.0) 14 (90.9) 25 (65.8) 46 (67.7) 
Ever injected drugs      
 Yes 177 (46.7) 98 (82.4) 16 (10.4) 32 (84.2) 31 (45.6) 
 No or unknown 202 (53.3) 21 (17.7) 138 (89.6) 6 (15.8) 37 (54.4) 
Ever shared works      
 Yes 145 (38.3) 88 (74.0) 10 (6.5) 29 (76.3) 18 (26.5) 
 No, unknown, or NA 234 (61.7) 31 (26.1) 144 (93.5) 9 (23.7) 50 (73.5) 
MSM      
 Yes 8 (2.1) 4 (3.4) 0 2 (5.3) 2 (2.9) 
 No or unknown 371 (97.9) 115 (96.6) 154 (100) 36 (94.7) 66 (97.1) 
Ever incarcerated      
 Yes 335 (88.4) 92 (77.3) 154 (100) 34 (89.5) 54 (79.7) 
 No or unknown 44 (11.6) 27 (22.7) 0 4 (10.5) 14 (20.6) 
*HCV, hepatitis C virus; MSM, men who have sex with men; NA, not applicable; WEDSS, Wisconsin Electronic Disease Surveillance System.  
 
Figure 1. Maximum-likelihood 
phylogenetic tree of hepatitis 
C virus hypervariable region 
1 consensus sequences from 
samples from 379 persons in 
public health and corrections 
settings, Wisconsin, USA, 
2016–2017. The breadth of 
genetic diversity is shown, 
and genotypes are labeled. 
Scale bar indicates nucleotide 
subsitutions per site.
 Hepatitis C Virus Clusters, Wisconsin, USA
Among the 42 clusters identified, none comprised 
only persons residing in the nonrural catchment area, 
12 comprised only persons residing in the rural catch-
ment area (n = 34), 7 comprised only persons from 
corrections settings (n = 15), and 23 comprised per-
sons from >1 group (n = 77). Rural catchment area–
only clusters were more likely to comprise a higher 
percentage of women (47.1%) compared with 6.7% of 
corrections-only clusters and 27.3% of mixed clusters; 
this finding probably results from the higher incar-
ceration rate among men. We found no other signifi-
cant differences in demographics between rural-only, 
corrections-only, and mixed clusters. We were un-
able to compare risk behaviors between these cluster 
types because limited risk behavior data were avail-
able for corrections settings–only clusters, there were 
no urban-only clusters, and mixed clusters comprised 
many persons from corrections settings. 
Intrahost Genetic Variation within  
Transmission Clusters
GHOST analysis of the intrahost HVR1 variants 
revealed that 5 (1.3%) of the 379 persons were in-
fected with multiple strains of HCV (Table 2). To 
further describe the nature of HCV transmission 
across clusters, we examined the population struc-
ture of HVR1 variants to address whether the same 
virus variant was shared among HCV-infected 
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Figure 2. Hepatitis C virus 
(HCV) transmission network 
among persons in public 
health and corrections settings, 
Wisconsin, USA, 2016–2017, 
showing 42 clusters identified 
by Global Hepatitis Outbreak 
and Surveillance Technology 
(GHOST). Each node represents 
an HCV-infected person for 
whom HCV sequence data were 
generated. A transmission link 
is denoted as a line connecting 
persons where the minimal 
Hamming distance between 
sequences is smaller than the 
previously validated genetic 
threshold of 3.77%. Lines 
connecting clusters are colored 
according to genotype. 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of samples with mixed hepatitis C virus genotypes, collected from persons in public health or correctional 
settings, Wisconsin, USA, 2016–2017 
Sample/person no. Major genotype (%) Minor genotype (%) Risk factor* 
116 1a (96.75) 2a (3.25) Unknown 
63 1a (99.38) 3a (0.62) Ever injected drugs, ever shared works 
318 1a (96.18) 3a (3.82) Unknown 
338 1a (99.72) 6f (0.28) Ever injected drugs 
306 1a (98.57) 2b (0.59) Ever injected drugs, ever shared works 
*When this evidence is available, the person can be classified as man who has sex with men, ever injected drugs, or ever shared works. 
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persons as previously described (14). Although it 
is not possible to illustrate the k-step networks for 
each sample, we highlight representative examples 
of clusters. One cluster comprised 3 persons (nos. 
372, 338, and 362), and persons 338 and 362 har-
bored little viral intrahost genetic variation and 
shared 19 viral variants (modified Hamming dis-
tance = 0) (Figure 3, panel A). The third person, no. 
372, was infected with many virus variants with a 
single subpopulation that is genetically similar to 
variants found in persons 338 (Figure 3, panel B) 
and 362 (Figure 3, panel C). Another representative 
cluster comprised a simple dyad of persons (nos. 
84 and 86) who shared a virus variant (modified 
Hamming distance = 0.37) with only a minor differ-
ence between each (Figure 4, panel A). In contrast, 
the cluster of persons 281 and 367 shared a more 
distantly related variant (modified Hamming dis-
tance = 3.18) (Figure 4, panel B).
Discussion
This study demonstrates the ability to link statewide 
public health surveillance to HCV transmission clus-
ters identified by GHOST. The 33% rate of clustering 
that we found among key affected populations in Wis-
consin is comparable to that found in Vancouver, Brit-
ish Columbia, Canada (where 31% of persons who in-
ject drugs [PWIDs] cluster), and Baltimore, Maryland, 
USA (where 46% of PWIDs cluster) (25,26). However, 
those prior studies included only PWIDs from their 
respective metropolitan areas. Our study included 
both urban and rural populations. We found a higher 
rate of clustering in the rural catchment area, and ru-
ral persons who clustered were younger, a finding 
that aligns with the literature describing the particu-
lar burden of HCV on young persons in rural com-
munities (27,28). Moreover, these data highlight that 
the increasing rurality of opioid injection and HCV 
transmission among young PWIDs could be better 
supported by the expansion of molecular-based sur-
veillance strategies to reduce transmission. The avail-
ability of transmission networks would enable target-
ing of the underlying contact network structure such 
that persons who are highly central within a network 
contribute much more to infection than those on the 
periphery. This type of network-based disruption 
strategy has been shown to reduce incidence more 
than randomly targeted prevention strategies (29).
Use of molecular epidemiologic methods to in-
vestigate transmission of infectious diseases address-
es many limitations of traditional contact tracing, for 
which data collection is often time-intensive and re-
sults may be subject to recall and social desirability 
biases. Contact tracing among persons who engage 
in illegal activity is especially challenging because 
these persons are often reluctant to disclose inject-
ing behaviors or name injecting partners because of 
stigma or fear of criminal repercussions (30). There-
fore, identifying transmission linkages with GHOST 
can support more targeted contact tracing strategies. 
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Figure 3. Hepatitis C virus (HCV) transmission network among persons in public health and corrections settings, Wisconsin, USA, 
2016–2017, showing intrahost genetic heterogeneity within 1 representative transmission cluster. K-step network contains all possible 
minimum spanning trees and enables efficient visualization of genetic relatedness among all intrahost hypervariable region 1 (HVR1) 
variants for persons 338 and 362 (A), persons 338 and 372 (B), and persons 362 and 372 (B). Each node represents an HCV sequence, 
and the color of the node corresponds to the sample of origin: red, variant found in both samples; green, variant found only in the 
first sample; blue, variant found only in the second sample. Node size is based on frequency of the HVR1 variant, and edge length is 
proportional to the modified Hamming distance (does not count positions with insertions or deletions as differences).
 Hepatitis C Virus Clusters, Wisconsin, USA
Unfortunately, contact tracing was not performed 
among our study population, precluding further 
analyses. Because modeling studies have demonstrat-
ed that HCV can be eliminated through scaling up 
and targeting treatment (31,32), a concept known as 
treatment as prevention, often used in HIV research 
(33,34), conducting routine molecular surveillance 
may also advance HCV prevention efforts by facilitat-
ing efficient allocation of limited resources to target 
and treat members in clusters.
The first limitation of our study is that HCV testing 
and surveillance challenges make identifying a com-
plete cohort of HCV-infected PWIDs difficult. CDC 
estimates that approximately half of all HCV-infected 
persons are unaware of their infection status (35). Per-
sons not included in our analysis include those who 
were never tested, were tested outside of Wisconsin, 
or were tested in other settings (e.g., primary care) 
that use commercial or hospital-based laboratories 
for HCV testing. Accordingly, the population studied 
is not fully representative of the Wisconsin general 
population. However, our results do provide a cred-
ible picture of the HCV epidemic across public health 
and correctional settings throughout rural and urban 
Wisconsin. Second, the association we found between 
clustering and younger age among rural residents 
could result from having sampled a larger number of 
younger persons. Third, risk-behavior data are miss-
ing for a large proportion of the sample because few 
agencies routinely collect and report these data. Data 
may also be missing because persons may choose to 
not disclose potentially stigmatizing drug use and 
sexual behaviors, particularly in settings such as 
correctional facilities ,where persons may fear further 
punishment. Fourth, we were unable to determine 
from which catchment area persons in corrections fa-
cilities orginated. Last, phylogenetic clustering alone 
cannot directly assert whether transmission has oc-
curred between persons (36). 
In conclusion, our findings provide a snapshot 
of the HCV epidemic throughout Wisconsin during 
2016–2017. They illustrate the need to especially di-
rect resources to rural communities affected by the 
opioid crisis.
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Figure 4. Intrahost genetic 
variation of representative 
transmission clusters of 
hepatitis C virus (HCV) among 
persons in public health and 
corrections settings, Wisconsin, 
USA, 2016–2017, highlighting 
the genetic relatedness of 
distinct variants. K-step network 
contains all possible minimum 
spanning trees and enables 
efficient visualization of genetic 
relatedness among all intrahost 
hypervariable region 1 (HVR1) 
variants for persons 84 and 
86 (A) and persons 281 and 
367 (B). Each node represents 
an HCV sequence. Color of 
the node corresponds to the 
sample of origin: green, found only in the first sample; blue, found only in the second sample. The node size is based on frequency 
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